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NOTES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL
DISHONOR OF A CHECK
Prior to the general adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code'
(UCC) appellate litigation dealing with punitive damages2 as a remedy for
the wrongful dishonor of a check was common.3 However, as the states
began to adopt the UCC, such cases became less frequent.' Yet the UCC
does not expressly concern itself with punitive damages in connection with
wrongful dishonor. This leads to the question of whether punitive damages
are recoverable under the UCC, and, if so, what restrictions limit their
recovery.
Although there are several sections of the UCC which discuss
dishonor,5 only section 4-4026 deals with the measure of damages for
'The first jurisdiction to adopt the UCC was Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12A, § 1-101 et seq. (1970) (effective July 1, 1954). The last state to adopt the UCC was
Mississippi. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41A: 1-101 et seq. (Spec. UCC Supp. 1967) (effective
March 31, 1968).
'Four jurisdictions, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington, do not
generally allow punitive damages. Angelloz v. Humble Oil, 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1941);
Boott Mills v. Boston & M. R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914); Riewe v.
McCormick, II Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881); Ulvestad v. Dolphin, 158 Wash. 629, 292 P.
106 (1930). See generally, C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 78, n.2 (1935); H. OLECK,
DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 269 (196 1).
Among those jurisdictions allowing punitive damages, it is universally held that punitive
damages are granted at the discretion of the jury and are not awarded as a matter of right.
E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 204 Ala. 199, 85 So. 529 (1920); Clark v. McClung, 215
Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932); Hurst v. Southern Ry., 184 Ky. 684, 212 S.W. 461 (1919). It
follows that a jury is justified in refusing to award punitive damages even when malice is
shown. McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933).
3E.g., Third Nat'l Bank v. Ober, 178 F. 678 (8th Cir. 1910); American Nat'l Bank v.
Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 69 S.W. 759 (1902); Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. Silver Saver
Stores, Inc., 166 Miss. 882, 148 So. 367 (1933); Thomas v. American Trust Co., 208 N.C.
653, 182 S.E. 136 (1935); Woody v. National Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 40 S.E. 150 (1927);
Meadows v. First Nat'l Bank, 149 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Wood v. American
Nat'l Bank, 100 Va. 306,40 S.E. 931 (1902).
'Since adopting the UCC, only two jurisdictions have addressed the question of whether
to allow punitive damages for wrongful dishonor. Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435
S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968) (dictum); Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d
191 (1966).
5E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-403(l)(b), 2-511(3), 3-122(3), 3-412,3-501 to
3-51 , 3-802(I)(b), 4-202(1)(b), 4-210(2), 4-211(2), 4-301.
'The following are the state statutes containing the language of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 4-402: ALA. CODE tit. 7A § 4-402 (1966); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.456 (1962);
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 44-2628 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-4402 (1961); CAL. COMM.
CODE § 4402 (West 1964); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 4 155-4402 (1965); CONN. GEN.
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wrongful dishonor.7 Section 4-402 provides:
A payor bank is liable to its customers for damages proximately
caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor
occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual damages
proved. If so proximately caused and proved damages may include
damages for an arrest or prosecution of the customer or other
consequential damages. Whether any consequential damages are
proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact
to be determined in each case.8
The language of this section does not expressly provide for punitive
damages. In determining the measure of damages permitted, it is
necessary to interpret the terms "actual damages," and "consequential
STAT. REV. § 42a-4-402 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 4-402 (Spec. UCC Pamphlet
1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:4-402 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 674.4-402 (1966); GA.
CODE ANN. § 109A-4-402 (1962); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 490:4-402 (1968); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 28-4-402 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 4-402 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 19-4402 (repl. vol. 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.4402 (1967); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 84-4-402 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.4-402 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 4-402 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 4-402 (1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 4-402 (1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.4402 (rev. vol. 1964); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 336.4-402 (1966); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41A:4-402 (Spec. UCC Supp. 1967); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 400.4-402 (1965); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 87A-4-402 (1964); NEB. REV.
STAT. UCC § 4-402 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.4402 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
382A:4-402 (1961); N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:4-402 (1962); N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-402
(McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-402 (repl. vol. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-
04-29 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1304.25 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12A, § 4-402 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 74.4020 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 4-
402 (1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-4402 (1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.4-402 (1966);
S.D. CODE § 57-21-3 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-4402 (repl. vol. 1964); TEx. Bus. &
COMM. CODE § 4-402 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-4-402 (repl. vol. 1968); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9A, § 4-402 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.4-402 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 62A.4-402 (Supp. (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-4.402 (1966); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 404.402 (1964); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-402 (Supp. 1969). Louisiana has not
adopted the UCC. Both California and Nevada omit the last sentence of UCC § 4402.
'The drafters of the UCC provided that section 4-103(5) covering liability for "failure
to exercise ordinary care in handling an item" is not applicable in cases of wrongful
dishonor, thus making it clear that UCC section 4-402 was to be the sole provision of the
UCC governing damages for wrongful dishonor. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402,
comment 4.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402. Under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104
a check is an instrument for the payment of money and thus is an item under UNIFORM
COMMERFIAL CODE § 4-104(g). Hence, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402 applies to
checks.
One commentator has offered several reasons why banks dishonor checks. Among them
are: not sufficient funds; account attached in legal proceedings; checks dated ahead; payment
stopped; incomplete or suspicious signature; death of drawer; check drawn against
uncollectable checks; account closed. F. WHITNEY, THE LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL
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damages" according to the "sense given them by the leading cases." 9
Under section 4-402 a "bank is liable for damages proximately caused by
the wrongful dishonor."' 0 Proximately caused damages are those injuries"
which are the proximate result of the tortfeasor's conduct.' Due to the
necessity of an injury, the measure of damages allowable under the general
rule of section 4-402 is clearly compensatory in nature. On the other hand,
punitive damages serve to punish' 3 or deter 4 the defendant and only
incidentally benefit the plaintiff. They are not compensatory in nature, 5
ind are therefore only indirectly related to the injuries caused by the
tortfeasor's conduct. Hence, punitive damages are clearly distinct from
the compensatory damages proximately caused by the tortfeasor's
conduct.
Section 4-402 elaborates its general rule of liability so as to limit the
measure of damages recoverable to "actual damages" in cases where the
dishonor is made through mistake; 6 and the cases make it clear that
punitive damages are distinct from actual damages.' 7 Similarly, punitive
PRACTICES § 339 (2d ed. 1865).
A dishonor is wrongful whenever there is no justification for it. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 4-402. comment 2; B. CLARK & A. SQUILLANTE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS,
COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS, 32-35 (1970). Evidently a dishonor is wrongful if the
dishonor would ordinarily be justified but the wrong reason is given for the dishonor,
Robbins v. Bankers Trust Co., 4 Misc. 2d 347, 157 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106, comment 3.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4402.
"it is widely held that the term "damage"is synonomous with the term "injury." E.g.,
Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Fields, 188 Miss. 725, 195 So. 489 (1940); A.F. Johnson & Son v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 140 N.C. 574, 53 S.E. 362 (1906); see, e.g., State v. Griswold, 8
Ariz. App. 361, 446 P.2d 467 (1968). But see Carroll v. Rye Township, 13 N.D. 458, 101
N.W. 894 (1904) (injury is misconduct and damage is loss resulting from misconduct).
"United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 82 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1936); Sweany v.
Wabash Ry., 229 Mo. App. 393, 80 S.W.2d 216 (1935); Pielke v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 5
Dak. 444, 41 N.W. 669 (1889). In Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky.
1968), the court held that under section 4-402 proximately caused damages "would be those
[damages] which could be reasonably foreseeable by the parties as the natural and probable
result. ... 435 S.W.2d at 58.
t"Phillip v. United States Lines Co., 240 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1965), affd per curiam,
355 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1966); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 813,
440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); General Fin. Corp. v. Sexton, 155 So. 2d 159 (Fla. App. 1963).
"Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968); Laird v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
sRosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Stateexrel. Stringfellow, 254 Miss. 812, 182 So. 2d 919 (1966); Ingle
v. Mark, 58 Misc. 2d 895, 296 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1969); see cases cited notes 12-13 supra.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402.
"TBowers v. Charlestown & W.C. Ry., 210 S.C. 367,42 S.E.2d 705 (1947); Langford v.
Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 287 S.W.2d 32 (1956).
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damages are distinct from "consequential damages,"' 8 which in certain
circumstances can be recovered under the provisions of section 4-402."1
Since proximately caused damages, both actual and consequential, are
distinct from punitive damages, the provisions of section 4-402 do not
expressly allow an exemplary award. If the section is read with the premise
that it purports to create the exclusive remedy for wrongful dishonor, then
it must be concluded that because of the omission of any provision for
punitive damages in that section, the UCC precludes recovery of such
damages for wrongful dishonor. At least one jurisdiction apparently has
reached this conclusion."0
However, this restrictive interpretation of section 4-402 is not the only
interpretation possible. While punitive damages are not mentioned under
the express provisions of that section, neither is there any language
expressly precluding their recovery. Thus a liberal interpretation of the
section, which might allow a customer to avail himself of a remedy outside
the UCC, would not appear inappropriate. In furtherance of this view,
section 1-106 of the UCC offers the possibility of recovering punitive
damages outside the UCC by providing that "penal damages may [not]
be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of
law."" Pursuant to this section, if a customer can recover punitive
damages for wrongful dishonor under the common law of his jurisdiction
he will not be precluded from their recovery by section 4-402. Some
jurisdictions have impliedly sanctioned such a result in their adoption of
the UCC.Y In other jurisdictions, this result has been reached by judicial
determination.
In Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank,2 the plaintiff Loucks was a
partner in a paint and body shop. The defendant bank charged the
partnership checking account an amount owed the bank by Loucks'
IsSee cases cited note 14 supra.
"Section 4-402 expressly provides that consequential damages may be recovered if they
are proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402.
21See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A: 4-402 (1961), New Hampshire Comment.
2 1
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106.
22E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.4-402 (1967). The Virginia Comment states:
Although worded differently, the UCC is in accord with Code 1950, § 6-
71, repealed by the act enacting the UCC . . . .The Virginia statute
limited the liability of a bank for nonmalicious refusal to pay a check of a
depositor to proven "actual damages," withouf specifying what actual
damages are. (emphasis added)
As an example, the Virginia Comment cited Wood v. American Nat'l Bank, 100 Va. 306,40
S.E. 931 (1902), which stated that punitive damages may be recovered for wrongful dishonor
of a check in cases where there is fraud, malice, oppression or other special motives of
aggravation. The language of the Indiana and North Carolina comments accompanying
section 4-402 implies a similar result.
-76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966).
NOTES
partner, Martinez. As a result of the charge, several of the partnership
checks were overdrafts and the bank dishonored them. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico dealt with plaintiffs' claim for compensatory
damages under the provisions of section 4-402.24 In dismissing the
plaintiffs' additional claim for punitive damages, the court relied on the
absence of malice, which was required at common law,21 rather than on
the restrictions of section 4-402.26 Thus it can be inferred that had the
malice requirement been satisfied the court would have allowed recovery
of punitive damages based on the common law rules.
In accordance with this view is language in Bank of Louisville Royal
v. Sims. 27 While the Court of Appeals of Kentucky did not have to
consider the question whether punitive damages could be recovered under
section 4-402, it expressed the opinion that
[h]ad the action of the bank been willful or malicious, justifying a
punitive award, damages of this kind [punitive] might have been
recoverable as naturally flowing from this type of tortious
misconduct. .... 28
Again it was implied that if the common law prerequisites had been met,
recovery of punitive damages might have been allowed notwithstanding
the provisions of section 4402.29
It then appears that even though punitive damages are not expressly
recoverable under the UCC, they may be obtained based on a common
law action either in tort or contract. Under modern pleading it is not
necessary to specify a particular tort or contract theory for a cause of
241d.
"Id. at 199. The court did not cite any authority for reverting to the common law to
adjudicate the claim for punitive damages.
2
d.
-435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968).
2Id. at 58.
2 Pre-UCC cases dealing with statutes similar to section 4-402 carry the same
inferences. For example, in Woody v. National Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927), the
North Carolina court held that the statute in question applied only in cases where the
dishonor was made through mistake or error. The statute read in part:
No bank shall be liable to a depositor because of the nonpayment, through
mistake or error, and without malice of a check which should have been
paid. . . except for the actual damage by reason of such nonpayment that
the depositor shall prove, and in such event the liability shall not exceed the
amount of damage so proven.
Id. at 154. Since the statute was silent as to malicious dishonor, the court held that the
common law, rather than the statute, applied. The comment to the North Carolina UCC
indicates that the same result would be reached under the UCC. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-
402 (repl. vol. 1965), North Carolina Comment.
1971]
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action;"0 however, the measure of damages recoverable in contract or tort
constitutes an important consideration in electing a cause of action when
punitive damages are sought.
The Restatement of Contracts reflects the general rule that punitive
damages are not recoverable for breach of contract.3 ' With reference to
wrongful dishonor, the Restatement position is:
The fact that damages are sometimes awarded in spite of
uncertainty in the extent of the harm does not make them punitive.
Thus where a bank commits a breach of contract with a depositor
by failing to honor his checks or drafts, the jury is allowed to
award substantial damages to the depositor for the harm to his
credit, even though he can prove no definite monetary loss. These
damages are compensatory only, however; and it would be error to
instruct the jury to award damages by way of punishment.32
While the Restatement position is in accord with a number of
jurisdictions, 3 some courts have limited it when faced with wrongful
dishonor causes of action based on contract. In Weiner v. Pennsylvania
Co.,34 the court reasoned that since a bank's liability with respect to
handling checks was not predicated on negligence, as in the case of
payment of forged checks, its liability was based on an implied contract.
3 5
However, the court stated that the plaintiff could recover punitive
damages for breach of contract, although no authorities were cited in
support of this conclusion.36 Other cases have held that a customer may
recover punitive damages for a bank's breach of contract in wrongfully
dishonoring a check if the breach is malicious 3 7 or fraudulent.3 And in a
case3 decided since the adoption of the UCC it was held that a plaintiff
could not recover punitive damages for breach of a bank's implied
1.See W. BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 38-41 (1965).
31RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932); see generally C. MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 81 (1935).
3
1RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342, comment (b) (1932).
-E.g., White, Inc. v. Metropolitan Merchandise Mart, Inc., 48 Del. 526, 107 A.2d 892
(1954); Mabery v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 173 Kan. 586, 250 P.2d 824 (1952); Smyth v.
Fleischmann, 214 S.C. 263, 52 S.E.2d 199 (1949); White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 155
N.W.2d 74 (1967).
"160 Pa. Super. 320,51 A.2d 385 (1947).
1Id. at 386. The UCC does not predicate liability for wrongful dishonor on negligence.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402. Hence, the reasoning here is applicable to cases
involving wrongful dishonor.
151 A.2d at 386.
3Tromas v. American Trust Co., 208 N.C. 653, 182 S.E. 136 (1935) (since dishonor
was not malicious, plaintiff customer limited to actual damages).
31See Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 429 P.2d 368 (1967); cf. Wheeler v.
Bank of Edenton, 209 N.C. 258, 183 S.E. 269 (1936).
"oBank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170,429 P.2d 368 (1967).
NOTES
contract unless the breach was accompanied by a "fraudulent act, wanton
in character and maliciously intentional."4
Although some courts have permitted recovery of punitive damages in
contract actions, the availability of such recovery is limited.4 It would
thus appear advantageous to a plaintiff to use the more conventional route
of a cause of action sounding in tort.
Originally there was no distinction between tort and contract.12
However, with the advent of causes of action a distinction arose.4 3
Nevertheless, the gap between tort and contract was never so wide that it
could not be bridged, as was recognized as early as 1844:
[W]here there is a contract, there may be an action of tort founded
on the neglect to perform that duty, as such neglect amounts to
deceit. The contract creates a duty, and the neglect to perform that
duty is a misfeasance and a tort.44
This reasoning can be applied to the bank-depositor relationship;4 5 and the
view, that there is an implied contract between the bank and its customer
and out of this contract arises a duty to pay the customer's checks, has
been adopted in this country.46 A duty to pay has also been imposed on the
bank based on the debtor-creditor aspects of the bank-customer
relationship.
47
The imposition on the bank of a duty to pay a check is perhaps best
grounded on policy reasons. In Valley National Bank v. Witter,4" the
Supreme Court of Arizona noted that the bank-depositor relationship was
essentially one of debtor-creditor and therefore contractual in nature.
"Id. at 378. The court further stated that these requirements were disjunctive.
4Notes 24-30 supra.
"Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, 381 (1953).
Old. at 381-87.
"Brown v. Boorman, I I Cl. & F. 1, 8 Eng. Rep. 1003, 1012 (1844).
41t was further stated in the case:
There is no reason for taking this case out of the general rule, that where
agents and servants are entrusted with property of other persons for any
purpose, it is fault in them to act contrary to their engagement; and though
assumpsit may be maintained against them in respect of a particular
contract, case may also be maintained against them for a breach of their
general duty.
Id. at 1013.
4"First Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 204 Ala. 199, 85 So. 529 (1920) (liability arises out of the
bank's implied contract, and out of the contract a duty to pay its depositor's checks on
demand); First Nat'l Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. St. 94, 11 A. 304 (1887).
"7Woody v. National Bank, 149 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150, 152 (1927) (bank-depositor
relatonship, a long-standing exception to the general rule that a creditor cannot maintain a
tort action against his debtor for failure to pay a debt).
"58 Ariz.491, 121 P.2d 414 (1942).
1971]
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Nonetheless, the court stated that a tort action could be brought for
wrongful dishonor because a wrongful dishonor amounted to
"imputation of wrong-doing against the depositor and an attack upon his
character."99 The concept of an implied duty arising out of the bank-
depositor relationship has gained acceptance until it is now supported by
the weight of authority.
50
Aside from a violation of some general duty, some courts have seen fit
to find specific torts in certain cases of wrongful dishonor. In Marcum v.
Security Trust & Savings Co.,5 1 the court held that defamation was an
acceptable cause of action in cases of wrongful dishonor. It was reasoned
that the dishonor by the bank could be construed as a claim that the
depositor acted dishonestly and in bad faith.5 2 Wrongful dishonor also
gave rise to a cause of action in slander in Schaffner v. Ehrman. In this
case the Illinois court noted that slander required malice, and that the
requirement would be satisfied if the plaintiff could show that the bank
wrongfully refused to pay the check and the dishonor was intentional. In
this situation, the court did not require intent on the part of the bank to
injure the drawer.Y Similarly, libel has been held to be an appropriate
cause of action when a bank wrongfully dishonored an attorney's check.55
The importance of defamation to the recovery of punitive damages for
wrongful dishonor has diminished with the adoption of section 4-402 and
its broad base of liability." However, these theories may be helpful in
"Id. at 418.
'Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644,
30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963); Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie, 220 Mo. App. 165, 281 S.W. 130
(1926).
51221 Ala. 419, 129 So. 74 (1930).
521d. at 77-78. The court stated that:
[tihe conduct of the bank could be construed as a claim that plaintiff in a
representative or official capacity had thus drawn a check of the depositor
which had no funds subject to it, and was therefore an act of dishonesty
and bad faith on his part, as an individual. If this is a defamation by
conduct of the depositor, the jury could infer that it was such of plaintiff
also.
Id. at 78.
- 139 Ill. 109,28 N.E. 917 (1891).
mId. at 919. A dissenting opinion suggested that tort was inappropriate and that the
correct action was in contract. Id.
-'Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.
1951).
On the other side of the spectrum is the movement to impose liability for negligent use
of language. See, e.g., Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON
TORTS, 325 (1924). However, this would have little or no application to recovery of punitive
damages because malice is a requisite to such a recovery. Notes 58-67 and accompanying
text infra.
"The measure of damages set forth in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402 is not
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characterizing the cause of action as one in tort, thereby possibly avoiding
denial of a claim for punitive damages due to its contractual nature.57
As a part of his tort cause of action, a customer is required to establish
malice before he can recover punitive damages. 5 This requirement is
almost universally recognized, by both the writers s9 and the courts.6 0 This
rule has been extended to cases involving wrongful dishonor.61 Although
the requirement of malice is uniform, the interpretation of what
constitutes malice varies with the jurisdiction. Various courts have
interpreted malice to include: a fraudulent act, wanton in character and
maliciously intentional;62 "actual malice, oppression, or bad motive";6"
"fraud, malice, oppression, or other special motives of aggravation"; 4
dependent on what theory the cause of action is brought on. See note 8 and accompanying
text supra.
"Notes 1-7 and accompanying text supra.
uNotes 60-68 infra.
"E.g., C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 81 (1935); C. MORRIS, TORTS 48 (1953); see, e.g.,
F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 2-7 (1926); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF
TORTS § 25.1 (1956).
"Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 I11. 192, 131 N.E. 675, 677 (1921).
The malice requirement has been formulated both in terms of legal malice and actual
malice. See, e.g., Pashalian v. Big-4 Chevrolet Co., 348 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961)
(legal or actual malice required); Kirby v. Gulf Ref. Co., 173 S.C. 224, 175 S.E. 535 (1934)
(legal malice required); Cook v. Patterson Drug Co., 185 Va. 516, 39 S.E.2d 304 (1946)
(actual or express malice required in legal libel action). See also Smithhisler v. Dutter, 157
Ohio St. 454, 105 N.E.2d 868, 871 (1952) (acknowledged division of authorities as to where
legal or actual malice required for punitive damages).
Some jurisdictions have expanded the malice requirement to include such alternate
requirements as willfulness, wantoness, oppression, outrageous conduct, and fraud. E.g.,
Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932) (fraud, malice, or oppression); Ross v.
Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950) (malice, moral turpitude, wantoness or outrageous conduct);
Home Fin. Co. v. Ratliff, 374 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1964) (willful, wanton, malicious or grossly
negligent actions); Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948)
(malicious or wanton); Wooton v. Shaw, 205 Okla. 283, 237 P.2d 442 (1951) (fraud, malice
or oppression accompanied by evil intent or such gross negligence in disregard of another's
rights as to be equivalent to such intent). It follows that no punitive damages can be awarded
when a tort is committed by mistake or in the belief that the act is lawful. Thomas v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 335 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Lyon, 123 Pa. St. 140, 16 A. 607 (1889). It has also been held that the mere proof of an
intentional tort does not of itself entitle a party to punitive damages. Bryson v. Swank, 168
So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
In establishing various standards for the malice requirement, the courts have treated
them as disjunctive and have required proof of only violation of one standard. See, e.g.,
Norton v. Bumpus, 221 Ala. 167, 127 So. 907 (1930).
For a specific discussion of how the courts have interpreted the malice requirement in
relation to wrongful dishonor, see notes 62-66 and accompanying text infra.
"Cases cited notes 56-62 infra.
"Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170,429 P.2d 368 (1967).
"American Nat'l Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 69 S.W. 759, 760 (1902).
"Wood v. American Nat'l Bank, 100 Va. 306,40 S.E. 931, 934 (1902).
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and reckless or wanton actions.65 It appears that malice generally can be
characterized as an intentional wrongful dishonor or a dishonor which is
wrongful and effected wantonly or recklessly. It follows that if a bank
dishonors a check, believing the dishonor to be rightful, no malice is
implied." Such a holding is consistent with the provisions of section 4-402
which limit damages to "actual damages proved" in cases where dishonor
occurs through mistake.
7
Assuming a plaintiff has established that the bank acted with malice
within the meaning given the term in his jurisdiction, he may still be faced
with major obstacles before any recovery of punitive damages is allowed.
A plaintiff must show that he is entitled to actual damages before punitive
damages can be recovered. The doctrine has its roots in the rule that there
can be no cause of action for punitive damages alone.6 ' A derivative of the
rule is that punitive damages must always be incidental to an
independently sufficient cause of action. 9 It follows, therefore, that before
a plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages, he must be able to
recover actual damages in order to establish his independent cause of
action. 70 Nominal damages alone generally are sufficient to sustain a
recovery of punitive damages, 71 and are compatible with the theory
requiring a plaintiff to have an independent cause of action.
The rule that a plaintiff must prove actual damage before recovering
punitive damages prohibits a plaintiff from ignoring the UCC in an
attempt to recover punitive damages for wrongful dishonor of a check,
since section 4-402 controls the award of actual damages for wrongful
dishonor. 72 Hence, a plaintiff must establish his right to recovery under
"First Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 204 Ala. 199, 85 So. 529 (1920).
"See Wood v. American Nat'l Bank, 100 Va. 306, 40 S.E. 931 (1902). See also
Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 96 P.2d 391 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1939) rev'd on other grounds, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 105 P.2d 118 (1940).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402.
"See, e.g., Crawford v. Taylor, 58 N.M. 340, 270 P.2d 978 (1954).
"See, e.g., Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932); Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa.
270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).
7sSee, e.g., Theo v. Crawford 119 Ga. App. 81, 166 S.E.2d 368 (1969); Clemmons v. Life
Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E.2d 761 (1968).
71E.g., Coonis v. Rogers, 429 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. 1968); Crawford v. Taylor, 58 N.M.
340, 270 P.2d 978 (1954). In Hinson v. A.T. Sistare Const. Co., 236 S.C. 125, 113 S.E.2d
341, 345 (1960), the court allowed a verdict for punitive damages alone to stand on the theory
that there was a merger of nominal and punitive damages. However, this approach is not
universally accepted. For example, in Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959), the
plaintiff was not permitted to recover punitive damages from second joint tortfeasor even
though he recovered compensatory damages from first tortfeasor, thereby implying that the
court would not infer that nominal or actual damages merged with punitive damages.
7See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
NOTES
this section in order to recover the actual damages necessary for recovery
of punitive damages.1
3
Before a plaintiff can recover punitive damages from a bank for
wrongful dishonor, the plaintiff must further show that the bank, as a
corporate entity, is an appropriate party to hold liable. While it is
generally accepted that corporations can be held liable for punitive
damages,7" there is a split of authority as to what circumstances must exist
before they are recoverable from a corporation.7 5 Some courts require that
the corporation ratify the acts of its agent before it can be held liable for
punitive damages.76 However, the prevailing rule77 does not appear to
nln establishing his right to recovery under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402, a
plaintiff should be careful to maintain that his recovery is based on tort. See notes 17-18 and
accompanying text supra.
7The theory allowing assessment of punitive damage against a corporation is usually
grounded on policy reasons. For example, in Jeffersonville R.R. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. I (1867),
the Supreme Court of Indiana stated:
It is argued that a corporation cannot be supposed to act willfully or
maliciously, and that therefore the damages cannot go beyond the point of
actual compensation. This reason is too metaphysical to be applied in
testing the civil liability of a corporation. Practically, there is a human
intelligence and volition whichcontrols the affairs of a corporation, just
like those of an individual, and which may act wilfully, maliciously or
recklessly, thus laying the basis for exemplary damages; and therefore
whatever rule of damages would apply in a suit against a natural person
ought to apply in a suit against a corporation. Any discrimination in that
regard would shock the public sense of impartial justice, and would be an
unjustifiable innovation.
Id. at 7.
75See notes 76-78 infra.
"6Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Lightner Mining Co. v.
Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 120 P. 771 (1912); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Reed, 80 Tex. 362, 15 S.W.
1105 (1891); Freeman v. Sproles, 204 Va. 353, 131 S.E.2d 410 (1963).
The requirement of ratification has been substantiated to a certain extent on the theory
that punitive damages are not compensation to the injured party and in the absence of malice
on the part of the employer they should not be awarded because the employer is not deserving
of punishment. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893).
The courts have sometimes gone to extreme lengths to find ratification. In Norfolk &
W. R.R. v. Anderson, 90 Va. 1, 17 S.E. 757 (1893), a conductor maliciously and wrongfully
demanded the surrender of a passenger's ticket. The conductor subsequently turned the
ticket over to a ticket agent. The court deemed the retention of the ticket by the ticket agent
to constitute a ratification by the defendant corporation of the conductor's malicious acts.
In some jurisdictions, retention of the employee committing the wrongful act constitutes
ratification per se, See. e.g., Ricketts v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 33 W. Va. 433, 10 S.E. 801
(1890). Other jurisdictions treat the retention of the employee as an indication of ratification.
E.g., Voves v. Great N. Ry., 26 N.D. 110, 143 N.W. 760 (1913); Dillingham v. Anthony, 73
Tex. 47, I1 S.W. 139 (1889).
'90 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 4906 at 371 (perm. ed. rev. 1970).
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require any ratification; 78 the only requirement seems to be that the agent
be acting within the apparent scope of his authority.
79
While in certain instances it may be difficult to show that a bank is an
appropriate party to hold liable for punitive damages because of a
ratification requirement,"' the relative ease of showing ratification, if it
exists,"1 and the large number of jurisdictions not requiring ratification, 2
mitigate the severity of this problem. Furthermore, the courts discussing
punitive damages for wrongful dishonor ordinarily have not addressed the
issue of whether banks in general may properly be held liable," which may
imply that the problem is not serious or difficult to circumvent.
From the foregoing it appears that a court confronted with the
question whether, as a matter of law, to allow punitive damages for
wrongful dishonor has two alternatives: the court may preclude punitive
damages by a restrictive reading of section 4-402, or it may allow punitive
damages by a liberal interpretation which admits a common law remedy.,
Any interpretation of the UCC should be made in light of the
underlying purposes and policies of the Code and the specific section
involved." In evaluating the relative merits of policy arguments, it is
"8E.g., Smith's Adm'x v. Middleton, 112 Ky. 588, 66 S.W. 388 (1902); Kurn v.
Radencic, 193 Okla. 126, 141 P.2d 580 (1943).
"Louisville & N. R.R. v. Whitman, 79 Ala. 328 (1885); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246,
210 S.W.2d 293 (1948).
"Note 76 and accompanying text supra.
811d.
2Note 77 supra.
'Cases cited notes 3-4 supra. But see Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. Silver Saver
Stores, Inc., 166 Miss. 382, 148 So. 367 (1933) (bank's knowledge of teller's actions, when
teller acting in own interests, constituted ratification).
"An alternative to punitive damages may be found in recovery of damages
approximating punitive damages but in the form of actual damages. As an example, in
Galloway v. Vivian State Bank, 168 La. 691, 123 So. 126 (1929), the plaintiff's commercial
credit was at such a low ebb prior to dishonor that the defendant's wrongful dishonor did not
noticeably injure the plaintiff's credit. The court noted, however, that the dishonor subjected
the plaintiff to the annoyance and humiliation of having to explain the matter to his
creditors; and recovery was allowed for the annoyance and humiliation as actual damages.
And in Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644,
30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963), the Supreme Court of California allowed damages to reputation and
health to be recovered as actual damages. But in a case decided since the UCC, Bank of
Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968), the court held that humiliation and a
"nervous chill" were not actual damages as contemplated by section 4-402. Thus it appears
that the prospect of recovery of punitive damages in the guise of actual damages is uncertain
at best.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102, comment 1. The pertinent part of the
comment states:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying
purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of
the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the
NOTES
important to consider section 1-103,86 which provides in part that
"JuInless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act [the UCC], the
principles of law and equity . ..shall supplement its provisions." '
Therefore, unless a purpose or policy in the UCC against allowing
recovery of punitive damages is so clear as to be equated with "particular
provisions" of the Code, section 1-103 will allow recovery of punitive
damages under a supplemental rule of law."
The general purposes and policies of the UCC, as enumerated in
section 1-102,81 apparently do not indicate any policy against the recovery
of punitive damages through actions at common law. Furthermore, while
there is no place in the UCC where punitive damages are expressly made
recoverable, section 1-106 provides that punitive damages may be
recovered where specifically provided for by the UCC or by "other rule of
law."" Since punitive damages for wrongful dishonor cannot be recovered
under specific provisions of the UCC, they must be recovered, if at all,
under the "other rule of law" provision. Hence, if there were a general
policy or purpose against recovery of punitive damages under the common
law, portions of section 1-106 would be rendered meaningless. It follows
that to maintain the integrity of that section, no general policy against the
recovery of punitive damages should be inferred from section 1-102.91
While there is nothing in the current version of section 4-402 to
indicate a specific policy with respect to punitive damages, a comparison
with earlier versions of the same section indicates that the drafters may
have intended to preclude punitive damages under the current section. The
1950 version92 of section 4-402 stated:
The bank is liable to its customer for any wrongful dishonor of
an item but where the dishonor occurs through mistake the liability
Act as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed
narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes
and policies involved.
UUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103 (emphasis added).
"See In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968); National Shawmut
Bank v. Vera, 352 Mass. 11,223 N.E.2d 515 (1967).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102. The section states in part:
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106.
"The argument applied to the purposes and policies of the UCC collectively can, of
course, be applied to them individually.
'2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-204 (1950 Proposed Final Draft and Comments).
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is limited to the actual damages proved including damages for any
arrest or prosecution of the customer. 
9 3
In the comments to this section the drafters expressly distinguished the
actual damages recoverable for dishonor by mistake from punitive
damages,94 implying that the latter could be recovered in circumstances
where the dishonor occurs other than through mistake. 5
Arguably, the drafters of the current section 4-402 intended to prohibit
punitive damages, which were evidently recoverable under the earlier
version of this section, by restricting recovery to damages "proximately
caused.1'96 However, this argument loses some of its force when it is
considered that the earlier version of section 4-40297 was never enacted by
the states. 8 This raises the difficulty of imputing the intentions of the
drafters, who added the restrictive language to the current section, to the
legislatures, which adopted only the current version. Due to the
speculative nature of imputing intent to the drafters of the UCC in
changing the language of this section, and in light of the further difficulty
of imputing their intent to the state legislatures, it appears that the change
in language does not constitute a "particular provision" displacing the
common law as contemplated by section 1-103.11
If the drafters of the UCC had intended to make section 4-402 the
exclusive remedy, thereby precluding punitive damages, they easily could
have done so by inserting language indicative of that intention. However,
with the exception of the situation in which dishonor is made by
mistake,1KM no such intention is indicated. Absent such an indication and
absent any clear UCC policy to the contrary, it appears that punitive
damages for wrongful dishonor of a check may be recovered under the
common law.
JOHN A. PARKINS, JR.
"zUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-204 (1950 Proposed Final Draft and Comments).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-204, comment 4 (1950 Proposed Final Draft and
Comments). The comment states in part: ". . . and actual damages occasioned [by arrest
and criminal prosecution] (as distinguished from punitive damages) are specifically made
recoverable."
"5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-204 (1950 Proposed Final Draft and Comments).
The pertinent part of the section states: "[tihe bank is liable to its customers for any
wrongful dishonor of an item ... "
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-204 (1950 Proposed Final Draft and Comments).
"The first state to adopt the UCC, Pennsylvania, adopted the current version of section
4-402. Law of April 6, 1953, P.L. 3, § 4-402 (re-enacted 1959).
"Notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra.
'*UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402.
